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Abstract
Maybe an event can’t be modeled completely through one game but there is more
chance with several games. With emphasis on players’ rationality, we present new
properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a
new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of
strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash between
the United States and Iran in Iraq will be provided. In this system with emphasis
on players rationality, the relationship between strategic games and explicitly the
dynamics present in interactions among players will be examined. In addition, we
introduce a new game called trickery game. This game shows a good reason for the
cunning of some people in everyday life. Cooperation is a hallmark of human society.
In many cases, our study provides a mechanism to move towards cooperation between
players.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, number of international conflicts have been increased and this
issue can lead to dangerous political games. Countries prefer to avoid military
confrontation, this problems settled through peaceful negotiation. Cooperation is
only profitable to each government if the other government reciprocates [16, 19].
For this purpose, from game models are used to describe strategic interaction
between countries [20, 21]. There are aspects to a conflict which cannot be properly
modelled using static analysis. It is necessary to use a dynamic model for games
where there are constraints on players actions as time passes [10].
In game theory, players are two groups, first class is rational players and the
second class is irrational players. The environment in which rational players
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interact is called strategic environment. The essential assumption of a player’s
rationality is that he/she considering his decision probable impact on other
players, makes a decision along with his own benefits [2, 4, 29]. Each player
thinks about the game continuation according to his rationality. The environment
in which irrational players interact is called evolutionary environment [24, 28].
Study of games can be classified into two groups. First class is the studies that
speak about simple games with a few players and a few possible actions and way of
modeling by one game [22, 23, 27, 30]. Second class examines relationship between
games. Most of the researches conducted so far are of the first type and second
type research is very rare. Among the most important research of second type
can be Meta games and topology of the 2× 2 games. In Meta games initially a
game is selected and using Meta strategies of n type, Meta games are developed
and this structure is used to analyze game [13]. In topology of the 2× 2 games,
the games are classified and using reflections, rotations and moves from one game
reach to another and then the model result is applied in applied problems [26].
At the Theory of Moves, Steven Brams write: TOM is by no means the be-all
and end-all of applied game-theoretic modeling. The dynamic analysis of ordinal
games still has gaps that need to be filled and details that need to be worked out
[5].
At the Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, von Neumann and
Morgenstern write: We repeat most emphatically that our theory is thoroughly
static. A dynamic theory would unquestionably be more complete and therefore
preferable [30]. So, here we examine relationship between strategic 2× 2 games by
presenting a new system called dynamic system of strategic games. The dynamic
system of strategic games is a dynamic model of 2× 2 games. The most important
significance of this modeling is consideration of the impact of these games on each
other. In this modeling, games, strategies, and the pair of rational actions that
are created in the heart of a game will be raised and examined.
As an application of dynamic system of strategic games, we seek modeling of
conflict between United States of America and Islamic Republic of Iran in Iraq
before attack to Iraq until complete withdrawal of U.S. troops in 2011. During
Cold War, Iraq was one of the few allies of Soviet at the critical region of Middle-
East. During 1980s, Baghdad-Washington relations s improved and reached a very
good position. Yet, Iraq invasion of Kuwait in 1991 put it in a full hostility with
America and finally after September 11 attacks, America decided to overthrow
Saddam regime. The US invasion of Iraq and the policy guidelines that led to
it thus reflect a world view whereby the United States is thought to be both so
powerful and so benevolent that it has the ability to spread democracy throughout
the world, which can be achieved by military force if necessary [12]. The US
invasion of Iraq in 2003 is likely to become one of the most consequential American
foreign policy decisions of our time [3, 12]. After the war termination by collapse
of Iraq Baathist regime, America entered into Iraq and took its control. New
Iraq has found a position different from Iraq of Saddam Hossein period in foreign
policy of Iran. Iran considered the circumstances is appropriate to enter in Iraq
3in view of being adjacent with this country, collapse of Baathist regime, help to
people suffered from war and establishment of government in Iraq and entered in
Iraq. Both countries also belong to different models of international relation and
political systems. In the following, we introduce Trickery game. This game is an
asymmetric game 2× 2 which one of players can with cunning change his action
that reduces the payoff other player. Game theorists have introduced a variety of
games to express the circumstances of the event.
2 Results
Concepts and terms. Game-maker games
Here we examine the games dynamic system with rational players. Before start
of modeling, we present required concepts and terms. If a game produces other
games, it is called a game-maker game. In general, if the games g1, g2, ..., gn
generate games g
′
1, g
′
2, ..., g
′
m, then gi- and g
′
i-s are called producer and produced,
respectively. We call the form of displaying game-maker games as dynamic system
of strategic games.
Strategy-maker game
We consider strategic 2× 2 games with perfect information. If a game create
one or more strategies is will be called strategy-maker game. Each strategy has
at least two pairs of actions. Each pair of actions includes players’ payoffs.
The produced strategies can be dominant strategy, dominated strategy, weakly
dominant strategy and weakly dominated strategy. Therefore, each dominant
action of a player can be called dominant strategy of a player. If a game doesn’t
generate any strategy, the game isn’t strategy maker.
In a strategic game with ordinal preferences, player is action a
′′
i strictly
dominates her action a
′
i if
ui(a
′′
i , a−i) > ui(a
′
i, a−i) for every a−i ∈ A−i,
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences [25]. If for player
i the action a
′′
i is preferred to action a
′
i per every choice of action of other players,
it is called dominant strategy and is shown by Sji where S
j
i shows j-th strategy
of i-th player.
In a strategic game with ordinal preferences, player is action a
′′
i weakly
dominates her action a
′
i if
ui(a
′′
i , a−i) ≥ ui(a
′
i, a−i) for every a−i ∈ A−i
and
ui(a
′′
i , a−i) > ui(a
′
i, a−i) for some a−i ∈ A−i,
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g1 C D
C 3,2 2,4
D 4,1 1,3
g2 C D
C 1,-1 -1,1
D -1,1 1,-1
Figure 1. Strategy maker games. The Bully game g1 is a strategy maker game of order
(2, 1). Matching Pennies g2 is a strategy maker game of order (2, 0).
where ui is a payoff function that represents player is preferences [25]. If for player
i the action a
′′
i is preferred over action a
′
i for each action choice of other players,
it is called weakly dominant strategy and will be represented by Sji .
If a game with n players is strategy maker for k players (1 ≤ k ≤ n) it is called
strategy maker game of order (n, k). If a game with n players isn’t strategy maker
it is called strategy maker game of order (n, 0). In other word, we can consider a
strategy maker game of order (n, 0) as a game which is not strategy maker. In Fig.
1, we consider row player as player 1 and column player as player 2. The Bully
game g1 is a strategy maker game of order (2, 1). This game generates dominant
strategy of defect D and dominated strategy of cooperation C for player 2, but
this game isn’t a strategy maker for player 1. Matching Pennies g2 isn’t a strategy
maker game. The game g2 is a strategy maker game of order (2, 0).
The following example shows how a strategy maker game can produce other
games. Consider two players that play the Prisoner’s Dilemma g1 in Fig. 2. Each
player has two actions. Players can choose cooperat action 1C or defect action
1D, where kC and kD shows actions of players from k-th game. Players choosing
each action obtain a payoff. In the game g1 for player 1, the dominant strategy
1S
1
1 is defect and dominated strategy 1S
2
1 is cooperation. In this game, for player
2 the dominant strategy 1S
1
2 is defect and dominated strategy 1S
2
2 is cooperation.
In other words, the Prisoner’s Dilemma is a strategy maker game of order (2, 2).
Player 1 can do the game continuation process by strategy 1S
1
1 or strategy 1S
2
1 .
Player 2 can do the game continuation process by strategy 1S
1
2 or strategy 1S
2
2 .
Based on the assumption of players rationality, player 1 selects strategy 1S
1
1 and
player 2 selects strategy 1S
1
2 to continue the game. The strategy 1S
1
1 ends to
deadlock g2, i.e player 1 has designed game g2 for game continuation. The strategy
1S
1
2 ends to chicken, i.e. player 2 has designed game g3 to continue the game.
Pair of rational actions
Here we introduce pair of rational actions. Players preferences on pairs of rational
actions are based on payoffs that they obtain.
Definition 1. (Pair of rational actions) A pair of actions is called rational if at
least hold true in one of the following conditions:
• would be Nash equilibrium;
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1C 1D
1C 3,3 1,4
1D 4,1 2,2
1S
1
1
g2
2C 2D
2C 2,2 1,4
2D 4,1 3,3
1S
1
2
g3
3C 3D
3C 3,3 2,4
3D 4,2 1,1
(1C, 1C)1,2
g4
4C 4D
4C 4,4 1,3
4D 3,2 2,1
Figure 2. Game-maker game. Each player has two action kC or action kD, where
(kC, kD)i,j shows rational actions pair of players i and j from k-th game and kS
j
i shows
j-th strategy of player i from k-th game.
• pair of actions, would be Pareto dominant for both players over other pairs
of actions;
• for each game that is strategy maker of order (2, 1), pairs of rational actions
for one player is responses to dominant strategy or weakly dominant strategy
produced for other player.
In a strategy maker game of order (2, 2) where both players have dominant
strategy and the game hasn’t Pareto action pairs over Nash equilibrium, the Nash
equilibrium of game is the only rational actions pair. For example, in game g2 in
Fig. 2, the only rational actions pair is (2D, 2D).
In Fig. 2, chicken g3 is a strategy maker of order (2, 0). Pairs of actions (3C, 3C),
(3C, 3D) and (3D, 3C) are rational for players. In Fig. 2, the Low Conflict game g4
is a strategy maker of order (2, 1). Dominant strategy of player 2 is cooperation 4C.
Player 1 response to this strategy makes pairs of his rational actions. Therefore,
pairs of actions (4C, 4C) and (4D, 4C) are rational for player 1. So player 1 can
select one of the pairs of rational actions according to his rationality to continue
the game. In Fig. 1, Matching Pennies g2, the strategy maker is of order (2, 0)
and also there isn’t Pareto pair of actions property, on the other hand there isn’t
Nash equilibrium. Therefore pair of the actions haven’t rationality.
Classic dynamic games are ones in which players make decision consecutively,
that is, each player must make his choice after previous player’s choice. The
extensive form is applied to show a classic dynamic game [6, 11, 14]. As mentioned
above, game-maker games display form is called dynamic system of games. Every
dynamic system of games includes players set, strategies set, set of rational actions
pairs, system history, node preference and systemic preference of players.
A tools that can display dynamic system of strategic games is games graph.
Within each node of a graph, there is a strategic game in which players can make
decisions. Each node of this graph can be generator of the next game through the
two following methods and be connected to it:
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1. strategies,
2. pair of rational actions.
Players to move from one node to another nod proceed by selecting strategy or
pair of rational actions. Moving to the next node by the made strategy is always
preference of one of players but continuing game with rational action pair may be
preference of one player or both of them. In Fig. 2, game g1 through strategies is
connected to games g2 and g3 and through pair of rational actions is connected
to games g4. Strategy 1S
1
1 is preference of player 1 and strategy 1S
1
2 is preference
of player 2. Pair of rational actions (1C, 1C) is preference of two players. In fact,
methods (1) and (2) are edges of the concerned graph and each edge is created
by decision and preference of one or two players.
In each node, player can decide whether to move to the next node or not.
Nodes that a player has built through strategy or pair of rational actions, desire
to continue the game are called move node. A number of edges originate from
each move node. Each edge may end to a move node or a final node. Final node
is a node that players have no appetence to continue. If an edge ended to a final
node, play (system) finishes in that edge. If an edge isn’t end to a final node,
games system continues yet. Also it is possible that some edges end to one node.
In the case that all edges end to final nodes, games system finishes.
Now, we introduce a model of dynamic system of strategic games. Also
definitions and components of system is stated formally.
3 Description of the model
Dynamic system of strategic games is a model to examine interaction between
decision makers more exactly. Every decision maker is a player in this model. To
describe this system, we use the graph defined in above. In each node of graph
there is a strategic game with perfect information. A strategic game includes
players set, actions set and preferences on pairs of actions.
Now using graphs, we introduce mathematical model as follows. Graph G is
binary of (G,M) that first coordinate G = {g1, g2, ..., gn} is a finite set of nodes
that each node of this graph is a strategic game. Second coordinate is a finite set
named edges that edges of this graph are produced strategies or pair of rational
actions.
Set of all strategies produced by k-th game is represented by kS = kS1 ∪ kS2 ∪
∅. Set of all pairs of actions Players’ in k-th game is shown with kA = kA1 × kA2.
Set of all pairs of rational actions for player i is shown with kA
′
i that is a subset
of kA, for all k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}.
Let A = 1A ∪ 2A∪ ... ∪ nA ∪ ∅ and S = 1S ∪ 2S ∪ ... ∪ nS be two sets. The set
valued functions, rational actions pair φ
′
i : G→ A and strategy maker φi : G→ S
7for players i’s are defined as follows:
φ
′
i(gk) = kA
′
i =


{(kai, ka−i)i|(kai, ka−i)i ∈ kA} if gk has
pair of rational actions
∅ if gk has′nt pair of rational actions,
φi(gk) = kSi =


{kS
j
i |kS
j
i ∈ kS} if gk is strategy maker
for player i
∅ if gk is′nt strategy maker for player i,
for all i ∈ N and j, k ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}, where gk shows k-th game, (kai, ka−i)i
shows rational actions pair of i-th player from k-th game and kS
j
i shows j-th
strategy of i-th player from k-th game.
Every move of system as a member of set M is as follows:
M :=
{
m
j
k| m
j
k = kS
j
i or m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i or
m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i,j ∀ kS
j
i ∈ kSi,
(kai, ka−i)i ∈ kAi, (kai, ka−i)j ∈ kAj
}
,
where mjk shows j-th move of k-th game and (kai, ka−i)i,j shows the pair of
rational action selected by players i and j of k-th game. Players move function
ϕi :M → G2 and ϕi,j :M → G2 ∪ ∅ with ϕi,j(kS
j
i ) = ∅ is defined as following:
ϕi(m
j
k) =
{
(gk, gp) = gkgp if m
j
k = kS
j
i
(gk, gq) = gkgq if m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i,
ϕi,j(m
j
k) =
{
∅ if mjk = kS
j
i
(gk, gs) = gkgs if m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i,j .
The above function shows by what move two play nodes have been connected
to each other by one or both players. Consequently, it can be said that in move
m
j
k = kS
j
i , nodes gk and gp have been connected through the strategy selected by
player i to each other. In move mjk = (kai, ka−i)i the nodes gk and gq have been
connected by pair of rational action selected by player i to each other. In move
m
j
k = (kai, ka−i)i,j the nodes gk and gs have been connected through a pair of
rational actions selected by players i and j to each other.
Consider that H is a set including all series (finite and infinite) that hold true
in the following conditions:
1. ∅ is member of H .
2. Sequence
{
m
j
i , {gk,m
j
k}
}
i,j,k∈I
for all i, j, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}, is a member of
H . Each member of H is called a history and is represented by h.
3. History h =
{
m
j
i , {gk,m
j
k}
}
i,j,k∈I
is called final history if it is infinite or
there isn’t gk+1 that is a member of h.
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The set H is called system history. In Fig. 2, the system history is as follows:
H =
{
∅,
{
g1, 1S
1
1 , 1S
1
2 , (1C, 1C)1,2
}
,
{
1S
1
1 , {g2}
}
,
{
1S
1
2 , {g3}
}
,
{
(1C, 1C)1,2, {g4}
}}
.
Preferences of each node of a games system that are exactly the same preferences
on the pairs of a strategic game actions are called node preferences or tactical
preferences. Preferences on strategies set or set of rational actions pair of a game
is called systemic preferences or strategic preferences.
Definition 2. (Dynamic system of strategic games) A dynamic system of
strategic games with perfect information including:
• a set of players
• for each player, a set of strategies
• for each player, a set of rational actions pair
• system history
• node preferences (tactical preferences) on set of all actions pairs
• systemic preferences (strategic preferences) on strategies or pairs of rational
actions.
In dynamic system of strategic games, players using conditions of producer
game and generated strategies and pairs of rational actions decide what move
the do along with their benefits and what game they design and where they
stand. Also this system allows players to select among strategies and rational
actions pair which result in his most benefits based on their abilities and future
conditions using available information, according to their rationality and strategic
preferences. Hence, players can agree with each other on the next move and choose
a move that favors all or choose a move according to personal benefits. Players
can choose several moves at the same time that may one has a personal benefit
and other has a collective benefit.
In Fig. 2, by starting the first round of negotiations and choosing tactical
preferences in the first node, game g1 or first round of negotiations ends. Game g1
is strategy maker of order (2, 2), that is, producer of dominant strategies 1S
1
i and
dominated strategies 1S
2
i for playei and has pair of rational actions (1D, 1D)1,2
that is game Nash equilibrium and pair of actions (1C, 1C)1,2 that is dominant
Pareto compared to game Nash equilibrium for both players. In other words,
game g1 provide players with the above information. Based on players being
rational, the player i to continue game can choose his dominant strategy or pair
of rational actions, Pareto dominant. Players using analysis of game g1 in the
first round of negotiations and information obtained from this stage determine
their systemic preferences and predict their motion path. Player 1 according to
dominant strategy 1S
1
1 design deadlock game. Player 2 according to dominant
strategy 1S
1
2 design chicken game. Players agreeing to choose a pair of rational
9action (1C, 1C)1,2 enter in win-win game and wish this process occur in the next
round. Therefore, each player has designed two games to continue negotiation
process in the next stage. Player i uses strategy 1S
1
i as a believable or unbelievable
threat to continuation of the negotiation process and in the case of not reaching
result and leaving negotiations, they will choose the strategy. Choosing systemic
preference of game g1 and moving from this node, players enter in the next nodes
and determine their tactical preferences in the new node. Players along with their
benefits in nodes g2, g3 and g4 prefer an action that has more income and as
much as possible would be along strategic benefits and preferences. This process
of choices is performed in the next stages nodes as well.
In general, most of the games existing in nature or among mans and human
communities can be modeled by the dynamic system of games. For example,
games dynamic system within uterus that includes games inside uterus before a
baby birth or period of a persons lifetime with all events can be considered as
games dynamic system. As another example, the diplomatic relationships between
two countries during a certain period of time can be modeled by games dynamic
system. Inside a dynamic system by specifying times and subjects, there is statics
as well. Therefore, the existence world is a combination of both of them.
In the following example, there are conditions which show how players can
with help of dynamic system of strategic games reach the satisfactory conditions
for cooperation by bargaining from the conditions where there is unwanted unfair
situation and dissatisfaction. For more accurate expression, the row player is called
player 1 and column player is called player 2. In the conditions of example, players
can be two countries, wife and husband, two companies, and set of players actions
include cooperation action iC and non-cooperation action iD.
Consider two players that play Unfair game g1 in Fig. 3. Each player has
two actions. Players can choose cooperation action 1C or defect 1D. Players by
choosing each action obtain a payoff. In game g1 dominant strategy 1S
1
2 for player
2 is defect and dominated strategy 1S
2
2 is cooperation. Game g1 isn’t strategy
maker for player 1. In e other words, game g1 is strategy maker of order (2, 1).
Player 2 can continue the process of game by strategy 1S
1
2 or 1S
2
2 . Nash equilibrium
of the game g1 is (1C, 1D). Pair of rational action for player 2 is (1C, 1D)2.
Given the dominant strategy 1S
1
2 for player 2 produces responses of player 1 to
this strategy pairs of rational actions. So pairs of rational actions for player 1
is (1D, 1D)1 and (1C, 1D)1. Based on players being rational, player 2 chooses
dominant strategy 1S
1
2 and player 1 chooses pair of rational actions (1C, 1D)1
to continue the game. As player 2 wish to maintain his superiority, strategy 1S
1
2
end to Bluff game and pair of rational actions (1C, 1D)1 ends to Mixed Harmony
game. As a result, game g1 is producer of Mixed Harmony game g2 and Bluff
game g3.
Game g2 is a strategy maker of order (2, 2). In this game dominant strategy 2S
1
i
for player i is cooperation and dominated strategy 2S
2
i is defect. The game Nash
equilibrium is (2C, 2C). Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium compared to pair of
actions is (2D, 2D). As a result, the only pair of rational actions for both players
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is (2C, 2C)1,2. Based on players being rational, the player 1 chooses dominant
strategy 2S
1
1 and player 2 chooses pair of rational actions (2C, 2C)2 to continue
the game. As player 1 desires cooperation, the dominant strategy 2S
1
1 ends to
Pure Harmony game g4. Pair of rational actions (2C, 2C)2 ends to Stag Hunt g5.
Consequently, game g2 is producer of games g4 and g5.
Game g3 is strategy maker of order (2, 1). In this game dominant strategy
3S
1
2 for player 2 is defect and dominated strategy 3S
2
2 is cooperation. Game g3
for player 1 isn’t strategy maker. Nash equilibrium of game g3 is (3C, 3D). Pair
of rational actions for player 2 is (3C, 3D)2. Considering dominant strategy 3S
1
2
player 2, produces responses of player 1 to this strategy pair of rational actions.
So, pairs of rational actions for player 1 is (D3, 3D)1 and (3C, 3D)1. Based on
rationality of players, and also player 2 desires to maintain his superiority chooses
dominant strategy 3S
1
2 to continue the game. Dominant strategy 3S
1
2 ends to game
g5. As player 1 desires cooperation in every stage doesn’t choose a motion from
this game to continuation.
Game g4 is strategy maker of order (2, 2). In this game dominant strategy
4S
1
i for player i is cooperation and his dominated strategy 4S
2
i is defect. Pair
of action (4C, 4C) is Pareto dominant compared to pair of actions (4D, 4D).
Nash equilibrium of game and the only pair of rational action for both players is
(4C, 4C)1,2.
Game g5 produced by dominant strategy 3S
1
2 of game g3 and pair of rational
actions (2C, 2C)2 of game g2. Therefore, it can be concluded that player 2 for
the game continuation has involved in dichotomy between choosing dominant
strategy and pair of rational action that the dichotomy results in choosing of
game g5 for play continuation. Game g5 is strategy maker of order (2, 0). Pair
of actions (C5, C5) is dominant Pareto compared to pair of actions (5D, 5D).
Nash equilibrium of game and players’ pairs of rational actions is (5C, 5C)1,2 and
(5D, 5D)1,2.
Based on players being rational, they conclude from game g4 and g5 to cooperate
with each other. Hence, in game g4 pair of rational action (4C, 4C)1,2 and in game
g5, they choose pair of rational action of dominant Pareto (5C, 5C)1,2. As a result,
these two games are producers of the No Conflict game g6. In this step, the players
have no appetence to continue. In the following, we obtain strategies and pairs of
rational actions in Fig. 3, for game g1, we have:
φ1(g1) = 1S1 = ∅
φ2(g1) = 1S2 = {1S
1
2 , 1S
2
2}
φ
′
1(g1) = 1A
′
1 = {(1C, 1D)1, (1D, 1D)1} = {(2, 4), (1, 3)}
φ
′
2(g1) = 1A
′
2 = {(1C, 1D)2} = {(2, 4)}
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For game g2, we have:
φ1(g2) = 2S1 = {2S
1
1 , 2S
2
1}
φ2(g2) = 2S2 = {2S
1
2 , 2S
2
2}
φ
′
1(g2) = 2A
′
1 = {(2C, 2C)1} = {(4, 4)}
φ
′
2(g2) = 2A
′
2 = {(2C, 2C)2} = {(4, 4)}
For game g5 we have:
φ1(g5) = 5S1 = ∅
φ2(g5) = 5S2 = ∅
φ
′
1(g5) = 5A
′
1 = {(5C, 5C)1, (5D, 5D)1} = {(4, 4), (2, 2)}
φ
′
2(g5) = 5A
′
2 = {(5C, 5C)2, (5D, 5D)2} = {(4, 4), (2, 2)}
Functions of the game move are as follows:
ϕ2(m
1
1) = ϕ2(1S
1
2) = g1g3
ϕ1(m
1
1) = ϕ1(2S
1
1) = g2g4
ϕ1,2(m
2
1) = ϕ1,2((5C, 5C)1,2) = g5g6
The system history is as follows:
H =
{
∅,
{
g1, 1S
1
2 , (1C, 1D)1
}
,
{
(1C, 1D)1, {g2, 2S
1
1 , (2C, 2D)1,2}
}
,
{
1S
1
2 , {g3, 3S
1
2}
}
,{
2S
1
1 , {g4, (4C, 4C)1,2}
}
,
{
3S
1
2 , (2C, 2C)2, {g5, (5C, 5C)1,2}
}
,{
(4C, 4C)1,2, (5C, 5C)1,2, {g6}
}}
Dynamic system of the above games shows that what games players need to
perform to reach a mutual and satisfactory agreement. In many negotiations
between countries such systems as the above system can designed. From the above
example, it is concluded that Nash equilibrium of a game is a pair of rational
actions but pair of rational actions isn’t necessarily Nash equilibrium.
4 Second Persian Gulf War
America entered in Iraq in the shadow of slogans such as struggle with terrorism,
world peace, granting democracy and freedom. Here, using the dynamic system
of games, we will model the clash between the United States and Iran at the
time of American troop presence in Iraq. To this end, we divide this time interval
into five periods. And in each period, we will examine static games with complete
information that has occurred. The first period before the start of the attack that
is shown in the form of game g1. The second period from March 20, 2003 until
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g1
1C 1D
1C 3,1 2,4
1D 4,2 1,3
(1C, 1D)1
g2
2C 2D
2C 4,4 3,1
2D 1,3 2,2
1S
1
2
g3
3C 3D
3C 3,3 2,4
3D 4,1 1,2
2S
1
1
g4
4C 4D
4C 4,4 3,2
4D 3,2 1,1
(2C, 2C)2
3S
1
2
g5
5C 5D
5C 4,4 1,3
5D 3,1 2,2
(4C, 4C)1,2 (5C, 5C)1,2
g6
6C 6D
6C 4,4 2,3
6D 3,2 1,1
Figure 3. Dynamic system of games which how players can reach the satisfactory
conditions for cooperation
late 2004, when each player, based on his forces and facilities, was trying to fulfill
his goals that includes games g2 and g3. The third period is from the late 2004 to
the end of the Bush administration, which includes games g4 and g5. The fourth
period with the arrival of the new administration in America until the end of
2010, that including game G6. Eventually, on December 15, 2011, with the total
withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, the system stops which includes game g7. For
more information about Second War of Persian Gulf, refer to references [8, 9, 18].
Invasion of Iraq or Second Persian Gulf War resulted in production of many
games among countries of Middle-East region and other countries including the
game between two countries, for example, one can refer to Iran and America. We
consider America as row player (player 1) and Iran as column player (player 2) in
Fig. 4. The game between these two countries at the beginning of war was Anti-
Chicken game. In this game, America has two actions: either it wouldn’t attack
1C or attack to Iraq 1D. Iran was able to participate in the attack and make
cooperation with America 1C or wouldn’t participate in the attack to Iraq and
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make defect 1D. In Anti-Chicken game, the two players have dominant strategy
1S
1
i , defection and dominated strategy 1S
2
i , cooperation. Nash equilibrium of game
is (1D, 1D).
These countries with different and conflicting purposes and objectives entered
in the conflict arena. Clearly, every country attempts to realize its most and
maximum objectives; but in the way of achieving goals of each player, there is
other players objectives and possibilities. The more number and power of advocate
forces of a country, the more its feasibility of purposes and objectives. America
objectives in Iraq can be considered a part of Middle-East Strategy of this country.
Therefore, America totally pursues a government in Iraq that firstly, doesn’t
prevent keeping security and survival of Israel, secondly, keeping regular energy
flow toward west and thirdly, the aim of prevention of establishment of a anti-
American government and anti-western [17]. Iran totally pursues a government in
Iraq that firstly, Americas withdrawal from Iraq and its undermining in the case
of insisting on presence in Iraq, secondly, prevention of establishment of a regime
opposing Iran and thirdly, promotion of Shia groups position in Iraq scene.
Hence, players don’t desire to cooperate and continue the game based on their
strategic preferences. Dominant strategy for both players is 1S
1
i and the pair of
rational actions of game is (1D, 1D)1,2. Based of players being rational, player 1
chooses dominant strategy 1S
1
1 and player 2 chooses dominant strategy 1S
1
2 to
continue.
Dominant strategy 1S
1
1 ends to Bluff game g2. In g2, America has two actions:
either it takes control of Iraq with synergy of Iran, that is, it makes cooperation 2C
with Iran or take control of Iraq without synergy of Iran and wouldn’t cooperate
2D with Iran. In this game, Iran has two actions: either it makes cooperation 2C
with America to control Iraq or wouldn’t make cooperation 2D with America. g2
is strategy maker of order (2, 1) and producer of dominant strategy 2S
1
1 , defection
and dominated strategy 2S
2
1 , cooperation. This game isn’t strategy maker for
player 2. Players have pairs of rational actions (2D, 2C)1,2 and (2D, 2D)2. Based
on players being rational, player 1 chooses dominant strategy 2S
1
1 to continue and
player 2 chooses pair of rational actions (2D, 2D)2 to continue.
America War in Iraq in the classic form lasting for three weeks. By Baghdad
collapse and runaway of Saddam and his boys, Saddam’s regime was ruined, but
despite of Americans initial impression, this was a superficial victory. They entered
in Iraq with an attritional war with rest of Baathist Regime forces and Sonni
groups that gradually its intensity and scope was increased. Volunteer Sonni forces
that mostly had associated with Alqaede, entered in Iraq from other countries.
Their attack against Iraq Shiites provoked an ethnical war in this country and
made its situation more complicated [7].
Dominant strategy 1S
1
2 ends to Bully game g3. In g3, Iran has two actions:
both makes attempts to reach its objectives and wouldn’t make cooperation 3D
or withdraw from its objectives and cooperation with America 3C. Also, America
has two actions: either want synergy of Iran to control Iraq 3C or wouldn’t choose
cooperation of Iran 3D. g3 is strategy maker of order (2, 1) and producer of
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dominant strategy of defect 3S
1
2 and dominated strategy of cooperation 3S
2
2 . This
game for player 1 isn’t strategy maker. Players have pairs of rational actions
(3C, 3D)1,2 and (3D, 3D)1. Based on players being rational, player 2 chooses
dominant strategy 3S
1
2 and player 1 chooses pair of rational actions (3C, 3D)1
to continue.
Iraq situation became more deteriorated daily, violence increased and hate of
America was enhanced. America to prevent this situation attempted to reduce
the violence level by holding elections and transferring power to Iraqis [1]. In the
new strategy, to confront with threats, America persuaded increasing American
forces in Iraq, increase and reinforcement of Iraqis forces capabilities to establish
stability and peace, increasing participation of Sonni forces in power, pressure
on Iran and Syria to reduce support of groups and preventing foreign forces into
Iraq and attempt to negotiate with Iraqs neighbor countries [1]. By increasing
American forces in Iraq, pressure on militant groups was added and America
attempt to provide an appropriate base in order to participation of Iraqis tribes
in government and the political process of this country and finally, negotiation
with Iran and Syria to reduce support of competing groups within Iraq yielded
and violence began to decline.
Game g4 produced through dominant strategy 2S
1
1 from g2 and pair of rational
actions (3C, 3D)1 of g3. Therefore, it can be concluded that player 1 to continue
his play has engaged in dichotomy between choosing dominant strategy and
pair of rational actions that this dichotomy results in choosing Stag Hunt g4 to
continue. In g4, America has two actions: either it takes control of Iraq, by adding
forces and negotiation with Iran, that is, making cooperation with Iran 4C or
doesn’t cooperate with Iran 4D . Also, Iran also has two actions: either it makes
cooperation to control Iraq 4C or wouldn’t make cooperation with America 4D.
g4 is strategy maker of order (2, 0). Pair of actions (4C, 4C) is dominant Pareto
compared to pair of actions (4D, 4D). Nash equilibria and the game pairs of
rational actions are (4C, 4C)1,2 and (4D, 4D)1,2.
Considering the power and forces had in Iraq, Iran, started to extort from
America to reach its objectives. The Iraq National Parliament election was held
in January 30, 2005 throughout the country. Most of Sonni groups boycotted it.
Shiites Union and Kurds obtained 140 and 75 seats, respectively. Premiership
of Iraq was devoted to Shiites, Presidency office to Kurds and Parliament
administration to Sonni group [15].
Game g5 produced through dominant strategy 3S
1
2 from g3 and pair of
rational actions (2D, 2D)2 of g2. In Blackmailer game g5, Iran has two actions:
either intends to prevent establishment of a government opposing with itself
and promotion of Shiite position and wouldn’t make cooperation 5D or make
cooperation 5C with America for establishment of a government aligned with
America. Also, America also has two actions: either it supports establishment
of a aligned government with Iran and makes cooperation to control violence
in Iraq 5C with Iran or oppose an aligned government with Iran and wouldn’t
make cooperation 5D. g5 is strategy maker of order (2, 2). In this game, dominant
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strategy 5S
1
1 for player 1 is cooperation and dominated strategy 5S
2
1 , is defection.
Also for player 2, the dominant strategy 5S
1
2 is defect and dominated strategy 5S
2
2
is cooperate. The game Nash equilibrium and the only pair of rational actions for
both players is (5C, 5D)1,2.
In Iraq, the process of changes in the final years of Bush and the first
year of Obama showed that America’s new strategy was effective in Iraq,
violence has been controlled partly and tensions are abating. Continuation
of this trend provides more ground for US forces withdrawal from Iraq. So,
Obama government and America Congress have explicitly announced that
America doesn’t need establishing permanent military bases in Iraq. According
to the reached agreements and policies announced by the American government,
withdrawal of American military forces until August 2010 is realized and ended
until end of year 2011. In December 15, 2011, America terminated officially its
military presence in Iraq by holding an official ceremony in Baghdad airport
located in Baghdad Green Region, in presence of America then Secretary of
Defense.
According to players being rational, pair of rational actions (1D, 1D)1,2,
(5C, 5D)1,2 and (4C, 4C)1,2 chosen by players ends to Trickery game g6. In other
words, g4 and g5 are producer of g6. In g6, America has two actions: either it
reduces its forces 6C and gradually withdraws from Iraq or increases its forces
in Iraq 6D and imports more military equipments into Iraq. Also, Iran has two
actions: either it puts pressure on America in assigning control of Iraq to a new
government 6D or cooperates with America 6C. The game Nash equilibria are
(6C, 6D) and (6D, 6D). In g6, weakly dominant strategy 6S
1
1 for player 1 is
reducing forces and weakly dominated strategy 6S
2
1 is increasing forces. Also,
for player 2 weakly dominant strategy 6S
1
2 is to put pressure on America and
weakly dominated strategy 6S
2
2 is cooperation with America. The players’ pairs
of rational actions are (6C, 6D)1,2, (6D, 6D)1,2 and (6C, 6C)2.
Based on rationality of players and strategic preferences, players selected pair
of rational actions (6C, 6D)1,2 that ends to Hegemony game g7. In g7, America
has two actions: either withdraw its forces from Iraq 7C or maintain its forces
in Iraq 7D. Also, Iran has two actions: either cooperate with America 7C or
wouldn’t cooperate with America 7D. The game Nash equilibrium is (7C, 7D). In
this step, the players have no appetence to continue. According to our definition,
g7 is a final node and the system is completed. Dynamic system of strategic games
between Iran and America is represented by graphs in Fig. 4. History of system
is as follows:
H =
{
∅,
{
g1, 1S
1
1 , 1S
1
2
}
,
{
1S
1
1 , {g2, 2S
1
1 , (2D, 2D)2}
}
,
{
1S
1
2 , {g3, 3S
1
2 , (3C, 3D)1}
}
,{
2S
1
1 , (3C, 3D)1, {g4, (4C, 4C)1,2}
}
,
{
3S
1
2 , (2D, 2D)2, {g5, (5C, 5D)1,2}
}
,{
(4C, 4C)1,2, (5C, 5D)1,2, (1D, 1D)1,2, {g6, (6C, 6D)1,2}
}
,{
(6C, 6D)1,2, {g7}
}}
.
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g1
1C 1D
1C 1,1 2,4
1D 4,2 3,3
1S
1
1
g2
2C 2D
2C 3,3 1,4
2D 4,2 2,1
1S
1
2
g3
3C 3D
3C 3,2 2,4
3D 4,1 1,3
2S
1
1
g4
4C 4D
4C 4,4 1,3
4D 3,1 2,2
(2D, 2D)2
(3C, 3D)1
3S
1
2
g5
5C 5D
5C 4,2 2,4
5D 3,1 1,3
(1D, 1D)1,2
(4C, 4C)1,2 (5C, 5D)1,2
g6
6C 6D
6C 4,3 2,4
6D 3,1 2,1
(6C, 6D)1,2
g7
7C 7D
7C 4,3 2,4
7D 3,1 1,2
Figure 4. Dynamic system of games between America and Iran
The above modeling shows that complete withdrawal of American forces from
Iraq lead to more influential of Iran in the region. The Nash equilibrium (6D, 6D)
in game g6 shows if America in this game prefer tactical preferences over strategic
preferences, obtain better result and conditions to continue this system was
changed.
5 Trickery game
We introduced a new game g6 in Fig. 4, called Trickery game. The trickery game
is a asymmetric game 2× 2 that examines difficult conditions of decision making
between players. Consider two companies which compete for achieving a common
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G C D
C 4,3 2,4
D 3,1 2,1
Figure 5. Payoff table for the Trickery game
source. Two players seek for more benefit from common source. Therefore, players
request for a portion of source considering their potential and capability that
determines bargaining power of players. One of two players has fewer capability
to use from common source. Each player can choose or cooperation or defect to
resolve conflict. So, set of actions of the players includes cooperation C and defect
D. We consider row player as player 1 and column player as player 2. player 1 has
fewer capability to use from common source. The trickery game table is given in
Fig. 5.
The game has two Nash equilibrium (C,D) and (D,D). We call this game,
Trickery game; because player 1 can choose cooperation with player 2 until the
last moment and finally changes his action to defect by trickery. While, player
1 has weakly dominant action of cooperation, but assuming the choice of non-
cooperation by player 2, player 1 can with cunning change his action that Reduces
the payoff of player 2. This game is strategy maker of order (2, 0). It has three
pairs of rational actions (C,C), (D,D) and (C,D).
6 Discussion
The majority of results in game theory concern simple games with a few players
and a few possible actions, characterizing them in terms of their equilibria. Game
theory in static state use one game, but dynamic system of strategic games
use several games to model an event. With emphasis on players rationality, we
present new properties of strategic games, which result in the dynamics existing
in interactions among players. Since the classic theory of games lacks an explicit
treatment of the dynamics of rationadeliberation, dynamic system of strategic
games can be seen, as filling an important lacuna of classic game theory.
In this study, with a new attitude toward 2× 2 games that Nash equilibrium is
one of the most important properties of these games, we achieved new properties
such as strategies generated by a game and pairs of rational actions. According to
this feature, strategic games was divided into two classes, strategy maker games
and games that aren’t strategy maker. Strategy maker games itself are of two
groups: either strategy maker of order (2, 2), that is, the game is strategy maker
for both players or strategy maker of order (2, 1), that is, game just is strategy
maker for one player and not for other one. Also, property of pair of rational
actions for a game was raised. A 2× 2 game based on payoff of players has one,
two, three or four pairs of rational actions or doesn’t have. Also, games that
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aren’t strategy maker itself are of two groups: either has pair of rational actions
or does’nt have. The 2× 2 games can be classified based on number of pair of
rational actions as well.
With emphasis on players’ rationality and with help of strategy maker being
property of a game and pairs of rational actions of a game, how new games
are produced was discussed through a game. This choice that is taken place
based on player’s rationality is called the player’s strategic preferences. Players
action selection in the game conditions is called tactical preferences. Depending
on present and future conditions, a player may prefer strategic preferences on
tactical preferences and vice versa. Also, this attitude enables players to find in
negotiations and conflicts a solution to reach a mutual agreement. Therefore, to
reach this agreement, we outlined dynamic system of games with strategic games.
In this system players according their rationality determine the path of achieving
agreement. We use graph tools to display this system. In each node of the graph,
there is a strategic 2× 2 game and both players are able to decide. Moves or edges
of this graph are generated strategies or pairs of rational actions. The system
history includes games and moves chosen by players. Each player selects a move
which has more benefit for him according to his rationality. These stages continue
by moving from initial node until players reach to agreement in one node that
this node is called final node of system. By cutting periods and environmental
conditions, dynamic system of games can applies for modeling past events. Also,
this system can be used to model present and future conditions. With this system,
relations between players (countries, companies, humans,) can be modeled from
the first relationship to the last one. For example, e will examine the clash between
the United States and Iran from the time of start of the invasion of Iraq until the
complete withdrawal of U.S. troops using dynamic system of strategic games. The
result show that, whit withdrawal of American forces from Iraq results in Iran
hegemony in the region. Another application of this system is to relate games and
examine their impact on each other. Moreover, we introduce an asymmetric game
2× 2 which one of players can with cunning change his action that reduces the
payoff other player.
Dynamic system of games says that in most of the cases, player must wait for
other players’ move. The more limitations a game theory use, the more unlikely
its prediction for future is and the less limitations we need to heavy reasoning
and its analysis would be. We believe that maybe complete modeling of an event
through one game wouldn’t be possible but there is more chance with several
games.
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